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FlowTraq > Articles by: Dr. Vincent Berk

Author: Dr. Vincent Berk

Why Sampling NetFlow Traffic is a Bad Idea

Dr. Vincent Berk
By | March 24, 2015


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Sampled vs Un-Sampled NetFlow Traffic Explained

On any given day, a typical networked host will send about 30MB and receive about 200MB. About 300,000 packets are switched. During peak times, the average workstation initiates two to four network UDP or TCP sessions per second, and each session averages 34KB in size, roughly 100 packets. What’s more, these sessions are negative-exponentially distributed with regard to packet count. What does that mean? It means there are a lot more very short sessions of only a couple of packets, and then there are lengthy sessions with lots of packets.

When routers use sampling for NetFlow generation, an interesting thing happens. The sampling is done on a packet-count level, so a 1:512 sampling rate will grab roughly every 512th packet to update the flow state tables.

This is great for reducing CPU load. But it is not so great at reducing flow update rate. Here’s why: With an average session size of roughly 100 packets, each sampled packet is very likely to be part of a flow that is not yet in the state table. This means an entry is created, which will lead to a flow update being sent. Compare this to 1:1 unsampled flow generation, where most of the packets will go toward updating existing entries in the flow state table. Flow state tables are typically exported when a flow is 60 seconds old, or the table is full, and the old ones need to be purged.

Leaving the exact math out for clarity, if unsampled flow generation results in a flow rate of X, then a 1:512 sampling results in a roughly 1/5th of the NetFlow being generated. Not 1/512th.

This is the intuitive answer, and the true results of sampling depend much on the precise mix of traffic present on the network. Also, some routers will use adaptive flow sampling rates to keep their flow export rates constant. This means that at busier times, the granularity of the data becomes less and less. Although this is nice for CPU time considerations on the router’s end, it does not help much that the roughest data is collected during the heaviest attack!

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How Much Security is Enough?

Dr. Vincent Berk
By | March 13, 2015


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Strategically Apply the Security you Have

“How much security is enough, given a level of acceptable risk?”

A friend in the security industry asked me that question, the other day.

Isn’t it true that that forever and a day the generals of this world have struggled with that problem?  Not necessarily “how much security is enough” but “how do I strategically apply the security I have?”

The deployment of battle tanks has evolved significantly since they were first introduced in 1916 during WWI to break through trench lines.  Later, lightweight anti-tank weapons led to improvement in tank design, such as heavier armor.   Today, modern tanks seldom operate alone. They are organized into combined arms units which involve the support of reconnaissance, ground-attack aircraft, and infantry. [1]

Evolve to deal with a changing threat landscape

Tank commanders evolved to deal with a changing threat landscape, and network security executives should be doing the same.

In my daily interactions I often find network defenders deploying their limited defensive dollars in the rookie manner.  Kind of the way I apply drywall mud:  even layer everywhere, essentially leaving all the big bumps still visible, but now covered in an equally applied defensive layer.  Meaning it is spread thin across the board.  I’ve seen some network security centers spread their mud across the wall, rationalizing their argument as: “everybody has a firewall, and a WAF, and an IDS, and a SIEM, and a etc. etc. etc.” Try to buy cheap in all those areas, and only buying “weaponry,” if you will.  Firepower.

“Combined Arms” Approach to Security

The smart defenders (of which there are truly few) orchestrate a “combined arms” approach.  They look for the parts of their organization (mind you, I did not say “infrastructure”) where they are truly weak or at risk.  Then they make security deployment decisions.  Organizations differ, and because we employ people, their security aptitudes can vary widely from one organization to the next.  Individuals vary greatly in their susceptibility to delusion or deception, and gullibility even when it comes to handling security threats.  Typically the landscape differs across industries.  For instance, a web services firm (ecommerce) will have a very different threat profile than an insurance company (call center).  And the threat landscape changes.

Although this may sound obvious, because most of you have been analyzing these environments for decades, the truth is that in every organization there are people with constrained budgets and little experience, but lots of technical smarts, who are being asked big planning questions.  In fact, I dare even to say that security folks tend to be picked on their proven tactical skills, meaning they are good with scripts, and code, and exploits, and etc., while few ever consider their ability to think strategically  about security.  Trust me, a C-level exec will often entrust entire security policy to a kid who understands how a stack smash works, while the same kid cannot figure out how to talk to anybody at the soda machine.  Let alone truly analyze the terrain the org should be trying to defend.

Spreading security budget dollars

So the odd duck out is the security strategist who truly knows how to take a thin budget and apply it where it matters, to the specific organization he/she is trying to defend.  And when I find individuals who can think at that level I see a couple of stark product choice differences:

1.  They invest in visibility more than in defenses (crosshairs, more than firepower).

2.  They invest in process, procedure, and triage plans (yes, there’s products in this space, but a lot comes down to design and training) and finally:

3. They hold their vendors accountable for being part of the overall defense, instead of purchasing based on a checklist of features from an earlier version of their security product.

And so unfortunate is the difference here, though, that vendors have started pricing their firepower much higher than their aiming equipment.  This is why we know that the former type of CISO is much more prevalent than the latter.


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[1] Source WikiPedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tank

Fast DDoS Mitigation with NetFlow

Dr. Vincent Berk
By | January 16, 2015


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NetFlow is an abundant data source in any organization, because most routing and switching devices will export some form of NetFlow/sFlow/jFlow/IPFIX. Using flow formats to detect an incoming Distributed Denial of Service DDoS attack is therefore both a logical choice, as well as a practical convenience. However, there are also drawbacks to using NetFlow which may impact detection speed if not carefully considered. Below are some factors that impact the effectiveness of fast DDoS detection using NetFlow.

EXPORTER DELAYS

A big factor in fast DDoS detection is the speed at which your routers or switches are exporting their flows. Most devices are configured to export flow records when the flow is 60 seconds old. This means it may add up to a full minute delay before the router starts sending evidence of the ongoing attack. Since for most devices this delay is configurable, we highly recommend you dial this number down to 15 or even 10 seconds. Every second counts when fighting an incoming DDoS.

AGGREGATION AGGREVATION

When a “view”, or a “graph” of NetFlow data is displayed, you are actually looking at an aggregation of the underlying NetFlow. Meaning the actual flows are dropped in buckets before analysis can happen. Most typically DDoS attacks are detected based on a significant deviation in volume. This means a threshold is set, or a threshold is learned (both options are available in FlowTraq), and the “buckets” must fill to this threshold before a DDoS is detected. The bigger the buckets are, the longer it will take to fill to the threshold point. Smaller buckets overflow faster, leading to faster detections in most cases. What this means is that in general that the bigger/louder/volumunious a DDoS attack is, the sooner any detector will pick it up.

Conventional flow tools create their minute-by-minte (or even 5-minute-by-5-minute) buckets as the flow comes in, loosing granularity instantly. FlowTraq does this differently: flow is stored, and at the time of graph/view creation the buckets are filled dynamically at the required granularity, giving FlowTraq a detection speed advantage.

SAMPLING ERROR

Sampling is technique used to reduce the load on the analysis engine, because analysis engines typically don’t scale well. When sampling 1:50,000 flows, the error in the DDoS analysis becomes much bigger. Meaning: you cannot simply trigger an alert when you cross a threshold, because there’s a potentially huge mathematical error in a high sampling rate. The bigger the sampling rate, the bigger the deviation needs to be to confidently say there is a DDoS happening. FlowTraq was designed to scale in clusters to handle large volumes traffic while reducing the need to sample data. This means the answers are more accurate, and FlowTraq alerts faster with higher confidence.

FlowTraq reduces or eliminates the need for sampling. More accuracy in your data, means more speed in your DDoS detection.

Finally, not all DDoS attacks are equally easy to pick up. SynFlood and reflection style attacks are more straightforward, since both are very volumetric and loud in their nature. SlowLoris and RUDY style DDoS attacks are much harder to see fast, as the traffic volumes may never exceed normal levels on the packet level. Instead, FlowTraq detects these attacks by tracking the number of concurrent sessions, which do go up substantially.

Network Visibility vs. Network Monitoring

Dr. Vincent Berk
By | January 15, 2015


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When I ask people about their network visibility, they often tell me they have “network monitoring software” installed.  Often “network visibility” and “network monitoring” are used to mean the same thing.  But they are not.  Let me explain the difference:

Monitoring

Monitoring is simply watching for conditions such as downtime or link saturation and fixing them when they happen. Network Monitoring is generally bred from a desire to keep the packets moving.

Visibility

Visibility goes much further in that it is bred from a desire to be safe, and understand what is happening on your network. If people seek to increase visibility into their networks, they are looking to get multiple, or many vantage points from which they can observe what is happening, and might learn what has happened in the past. This is driven by a desire to investigate badness, catch bad actors, understand data movements, so we can decide what may be a data leak.

“Monitoring” vs “Visibility” in Known and Unknown Network Situations

Although to most people “visibility” and “monitoring” are the same thing, if we take a good look at the kinds of products that are offered in each space, we see they are tailored to completely different use cases: Most monitoring products are rough, collect only what is needed to solve the “uptime” problem, and don’t offer much in the way of handling the unexpected. Time-frames are rough, often 5-minute-by-5-minute, and historical data is notional at best.  Most of all, the different views of the network are limited and simplistic, lacking insight.

Monitoring tools help you deal with KNOWN future situations, while Visibility tools prepare you for dealing with UNKNOWN future situations.

Good visibility products collect data from many vantage points, offer a myriad of views into this data, and store histories, so that you have the tools you need to create the understanding of what may have happened. Visibility tools prepare you to deal with unknown future situations, where you simply cannot know today, what you will need to be looking at tomorrow. These tools offer a level of depth and complexity that allows a skilled operator to gather insight into almost any aspect of keeping the network safe and operational.

Selecting Monitoring vs Visibility

This difference is reflected in the price point of the different classes of products. Those who do not take the time to understand the difference between Network Monitoring and Network Visibility will not understand this difference, and dismiss it. However, those who want to understand what is happening on the network, to keep the network safe and operating, will gladly make the investment in good visibility products. After all: how do you know what medicine to take, if you don’t know what you’re suffering from?


 

Request a product demonstration or start your free trial now! Your security will never be the same.

 

The 1 Terabit DDoS

Dr. Vincent Berk
By | November 12, 2014


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DDOS Attack

Techniques to Identify and Shut Down Large DDoS Reflection Attacks

A large distributed reflection attack can potentially sustain flood rates of a terabit or more, for extended periods of time when properly orchestrated.  As networks and server capabilities grow in the future, the potential of these attacks will increase. What is important to understand is that stopping an attack of such magnitude requires hard work, and cooperation of many participating parties around the globe. Defending against an attack of this size takes time because it cannot easily be “turned off”. Here’s why:

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Hard Lessons From Heartbleed

Dr. Vincent Berk
By | April 16, 2014


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After a week spent testing servers, updating OpenSSL, and changing lots of passwords and even SSL key pairs, it is understandable for IT pros to be feeling tired of hearing about Heartbleed. However, there are good reasons to ask ourselves some hard questions right now, and to take to heart some of the lessons — uncomfortable or not — to be gained from answering them. The bug of the week (year?) may be fixed, but it is not the only bug out there and there is a difference between being safer and being safe.

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The NetFlow / sFlow® / CFlow / JFlow Flow Dilemma

Dr. Vincent Berk
By | February 6, 2014


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It seems these days that the marketplace is saturated with flow export formats. CISCO has NetFlow, InMon has sFlow®, Juniper uses JFlow, and there are several others. Few of these manufacturers seem to release details on the inner workings of their protocols, and their subsequent benefits. What follows is an overview of flow technologies.

NetFlow

For the NetFlow suite of protocols we most often see version 5 (supported by the majority of devices), some combined v5/v7 (the Catalysts), and some version 9 on the newer devices. Don’t be fooled by the ASA series of firewalls; they do not actually support version 9 flow exporting. Instead, these CISCO devices use NetFlow 9 to firewall events, similar to log lines: no real traffic records in there! NetFlow v5 uses a static packet format (and is in this way very similar to v7), defining IPv4 IPs, protocols, ports, and millisecond precision on flow start and flow end times. Version 9 uses a dynamic format which is parsed based on a template which is sent around first. These templates are flexible and allow for expansion of the protocol in the future. (Incidentally, IPFIX is based on it also and is versioned as NetFlow 10). JFlow and CFlow are the same as CISCO Netflow v5. Only NetFlow v9 and IPFIX support IPv6. (more…)

SCADA Process Control Systems should use Network Behavior Anomaly Detection

Dr. Vincent Berk
By | January 31, 2014


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Simple pattern detection is often sufficient to catch unusual ModBus communications to guard against breaches and disruption from hackers

Any organization that manages a large, geographically dispersed, physical infrastructure (like power grids, water, oil & gas, nuclear facilities, sewage or chemical plants) naturally employ computer systems that measure temperatures, open and close valves, and turn devices on or off.  These computer systems generally are referred to as “SCADA/PCS” systems, which stands for: Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition / Process Control System.

These systems are designed to allow operators to have central control of production processes, and monitor and measure system performance.  Traditionally these systems were designed with tons of wires running to unique devices.  Each sensor needed its own wire.  So did every electronic valve, motor, heating element, etc.  This got confusing and expensive fast, so several common-bus protocols were designed to put many devices on the same wire, and keep their communications from mixing.  A popular one is named ‘ModBus‘.

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It is time to start paying attention

Dr. Vincent Berk
By | December 6, 2013


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No evidence of compromise is not the same as evidence of no compromise.

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Simply put, if you don’t see any evidence that somebody might be stealing your data, it does not mean that nobody is stealing your data. If I’m not watching the backdoor, I cannot know for sure that nobody is walking in or out. Not until I start paying attention. The same goes for your computer network. And it is time to start paying attention.
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Avoiding IP Theft and Data Breaches with NBAD

Dr. Vincent Berk
By | November 22, 2013


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What happens if you don’t detect IP Theft in Time?

The Adobe breach threatened millions of users.  The Sony PSN breach affected 77 million users.

Once an attacker has access to the user database resource, it does not matter if there are 38 or 38 million records in there.  The bigger the company, the bigger the loss count will be.  What has undoubtedly made this compromise worse than it had to be was that Adobe did not find out until Brian Krebs indirectly discovered Adobe source code elsewhere.  It wasn’t until then that Adobe began their forensic search. (more…)

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